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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vELOY PAUL LOPEZ,

Case No. 16532

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, ELOY PAUL LOPEZ, appeals from his conriction of the crime of Murder in the Second Degree, in the
Mstrict Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for the
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft,
Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After trial and conviction by jury, the Court entered
:Jdgment of guilty for the the crime of Murder in the Second
Degree against the appellant and subsequently committed the
appellant to the Utah State Prsion for the term as provided by
:aw, of Five Years to Life.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the case dismissed, or in the
(~rnative,

to have the case remanded to the Third Judicial

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 10, 1977, the appellant and one Lynn
Oliver had a fight in the Drift Inn Bar in Lark, Utah.

The fight

continued for some time inside the bar at which point Lynn Oliver
appeared to be getting the best of the appellant.

The bar tender,

Meryl Watson, put both combatants outside of the bar to continue
the fight.

(R. 246).
The fight continued outside the back door of the Drift

Inn Bar with several observers peering through the back window
of the establishment.

One of the observers, Kimberly Horrocks,

went out of the front door of the establishment while the fight
was going on in the back parking lot.
Miss Horrocks testified that after leaving through the

tl

front door, she went around the outside of the building in

0.

order to be able to more closely observe the fight.

Miss Horrocks
ffil

testified that she saw Lynn Oliver fall down.

She also testified
ar

that when after Lynn Oliver was on the ground, she saw the
appellant walk over to him and kick him.

(R.

363).

Mr. Oliver

rolled over according to her testimony, and the appellant kicked

:t
:t
tt

him again.

ie
Other observers testified that they witnessed the
victim, Lynn Oliver, on the ground and that they observed the
appellant holding the victim in his arms and giving him mouth
to mouth resuscitation.

(R. 297).

to the location of the fight.

Paramedics were dispatched

Subsequently, they performed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,- administered
by the Utah State Library.
2 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:h

~irst
~m

aid measures on Lynn Oliver, and subsequently transported

to the hospital.

(R. 405).

After Lynn Oliver's arrival at the hospital he was
treated by Dr. John Sanders.

Dr. Sanders testified that he

treated the victim, Lynn Oliver, after his arrival at the
hospital.

He testified that he attempted to treat Lynn Oliver's

apparent brain damage through the use of chemicals, but that he
~elt

I

that the victim had no chance for neurological recovery.

'[R. 463).

The doctor further testified that after two EEG's

had been performed showing no brain activity that Lynn Oliver
~s

neurologically dead and subsequently the machines

lifu support of the victim were turned off.

maintal~lng

Subsequently, all

life functions ceased.
Deputy State Medical Examiner, Terry H. Rich, testified
that he was the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Lynn
Oliver on November 13, 1977.

He testified that he observed

Rltiple abrasions on the head and face of the body of Lynn Oliver
md that he observed two fractures of the skull and that underneath
:he skull he observed a significant subdural hemorrhage between
~e

bone on top of the brain tissue.

(R. 425).

Dr. Rich testified

:hat the subdural hemorrhaging would have been the cause of the
ieath of Lynn 01 i ver.

(R. 426).

Dr. Rich further testified that the nature of the
:ractures was such that they would have to have been caused by
:;par ate forces of some sort.
~nature of the

(R. 428).

Dr. Rich testified that

injuries was consistent with the victim having

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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been kicked twice; once from one direction, from the left side
of his head, and once on the forehead, by a boot.

(R.

429).

The appellant testified in his own behalf that he
was, in fact, involved in a fight with the victim but denied
having kicked the victim while the victim layed on the ground.
The appellant stated that on the lOth day of November, 1977,
that he was drinking with the victim when they became involved
in a fight.

(R. 498).

The appellant and the victim struggled

inside the bar for some time after which Meryl Watson threw
them both outside.

(R. 501).

After they were outside, both

parties swung at one another, drunkenly, both of them fell down.
The victim then started to shake and went into convulsions.

The

appellant took out the victim's false teeth and gave him mouth
to mouth resuscitation.

(R. 505).

Appellant denied having at

any time kicked the victim in the head.

(R.

519).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
ANOTHER CRIME IN VIOLATION OF RULE 55 OF THE UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE.
The appellant testified in his own behalf that the
death of Lynn Oliver occurred during mutual combat between the
appellant and Lynn Oliver.

The appellant testified that the

fight on the lOth day of November, 1977, arose out of an argument
over a fight that had occurred approximately two weeks earlier
between the appellant and a third individual named "Donny".
(R. 492).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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On cross examination of the appellant, counsel for
the respondent sought to develop the details of that earlier
fight.

Counsel asked whether, on that earlier occasion, he

had kicked Donny in the head while Donny lay on the ground.
counsel for appellant objected to this question and moved for
a mistrial, which motions were denied and the appellant's
answer of "no" was allowed to stand.

(R. 518).

In rebuttal, the respondent called to the witness
stand Janice Ortega, who testified, over appellant's objection,
that on the earlier occasion of the fight between appellant and
"Donny" that she had observed the appellant kick "Donny" while
he lay on the ground.

(R. 556).

Counsel made repeated object-

wns to the testimony including a motion for a mistrial,

(R. 557),

out the motions were denied and the testimony of the details of
the earlier altercation were admitted into evidence.

Appellant

subsequently moved for a new trial which motion was denied.

(R.

2!1,217).
The effect of the testimony is clear.

The respondent

:1ad earlier introduced the testimony of Kimberly Horrocks that
she witnessed the appellant kicking Lynn Oliver in the head while

r.e lay on the ground.

iliver.

The appellant denied that he kicked Lynn

(R. 518).
Respondent introduced evidence of another criminal act

ent

:n order to discredit the appellant generally as well as to

.:peach appellant's testimony that he did not kick Lynn Oliver
~t~ occasion of which the instant charges arose.

The earlier

~~ged incident of kicking was used to prove similar conduct
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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on another occasion.

In addition, the prejudicial effect of

such testimony is apparent.
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence makes evidence
of other crimes generally inadmissible.

The substance of Rule

55 is as follows:
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed
a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime
or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he
committed another crime or civil wrong on another
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48 such
evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some
other material fact including absence of mistake or
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge or identity.
(Rule 55, Utah Rules of
Evidence.)
The provisions of Rule 55 are taken directly from the
Uniform Rules of Evidence

(Rule 55)

and are substantially

similar to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

While

the Utah Rules of Evidence became effective in 1971, the substance
of Rule 55 had been in effect some time before that, since the
Utah Supreme Court expressly adopted a similar rule promulgated
by the American Law Institute in its Model Code of Evidence in
the case of State v. Scott, 175 P.2d 1016 (1947).
The reasons for the general inadmissability of prior
bad acts have been widely recognized by legal scholars.

As

Professor Norman Garland said in an article entitled Impeachment
Through Proof of Prior Bad Acts and Prior Convictions, prepared
for the National College of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Public
Defenders, June, 1978:
Evidence of character in any form, whether reputation,
opinion from observation, or specific acts will not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
- 6 - by the Utah State Library.
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generally be received to prove that the person whose
character is sought to be shown engaged in certain
conduct, or did so with a given intent on a particular
occasion.
The reason for this rule is that when
character is used for this purpose it is not essential,
as it is when character is in issue, and generally it
comes with too much dangerous baggage of prejudice,
distraction from the issues, time consumption,
and
hazards of surprise.
This long established rule thus
forbids the prosecution, unless and until the accused
gives evidence of good character, to introduce initially evidence of bad character of the accused. It
is not irrelevant, but in the setting of jury trial the
danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value. Bad
character and prior bad acts may not be shown for prOOf
of action in conformity therewith.
)lcCormick is in accord:
The long-established rule, accordingly, forbids the
prosecution, unless and until the accused gives
evidence of his good character, to introduce initlally
evidence of the bad character of the accused.
It is
not irrelevant, but in the setting of jury trial the
danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value.

ce

This danger is at its highest when character is shown
by other criminal acts, and the rule about the proof of
other crimes is but an application of the wider prohibition against the initial introduction by the prosecution
of evidence of bad character. The rule is that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal
acts of the accused unless the evidence is substantially
relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is
a man of criminal character.
However, courts have long accepted, and Rule 55 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence provide for, exceptions to the inadrnissabili ty
of prior criminal or civil wrongs generally.

exceptions recognized in this jurisdiction:

Rule 55 lists the
"absence of mistake

or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

:·nowledge or identity".
- 7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The question before this Court is quite simply:

Which

of the exceptions set forth above could possibly accommodate the
admission of testimony about the earlier altercation between the
appellant and the victim?

The evidence belies any contention

that absence of mistake or accident could be made.

Prior fights

or arguments frequently relate to motive in homicide cases.
People v. Thiede, 11 Utah 281, 39 P. 837

(See

(1895).

However, there is no contention in this case that there
was "bad blood" between the victim and the appellant.

To the

contrary, the record is replete with evidence that the two
combatants were friends.

It is uncontroverted that on the evening

in question contact between the victim and the appellant began as
a few drinks together as friends.
he regarded the victim as a friend.

The appellant testified that
(R. 507).

Immediately after

the victim lapsed into convulsion the appellant gave mouth-tomouth resuscitation in a futile attempt to save the victim's life.
(R. 509).

There was no contention by the prosecution that the

earlier events constituted a motive for intentional killing, and
the facts do not support such a contention.
The exceptions of motive, opportunity, intent, preparatJor
plan, knowledge and identity are all not applicable in this case.
The evidence before this Court and jury as the appellant was asked
about the details of the previous fight obviated the necessity for

b,
c:

further inquiry into the events.
The true purpose underlying the respondents's delving
into this aspect of the earlier fight is clear.

The impact upon

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lJ

the jury of showing that the appellant had kicked another
person on another occasion would be to buttress directly the
respondent's contention that the appellant kicked the victim on
this occasion.

It is precisely this type of inference which is

unacceptable under Rule 55.
The admission on rebuttal of the testimony of Janice
Ortega was nothing more than a thinly disguised attempt to show
that appellant had a propensity for violent criminal acts, and
us prejudicial to him.
578 P.2d 512

As the Court stated in State v. Green,

(Utah 1978):

. in the interest of justice the defendant is
entitled to be tried on the charge against him,
and without having any prejudice aroused by
attempting to disgrace him, or show a disposition
to commit crime.
(578 P. 2d at 513-514).
The effect of such evidence as was here introduced
was to inflame and prejudice the jury and to deny appellant a
fair trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that pursuit of
ruch collateral issues had no legitimate purpose and was prejudicial
iH

well.

In State v. Dickson, 12 Utah (2d) 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961),

:Jor the Court reversed defendant's conviction of robbery.

The Court

indicated that allowing cross-examination of defendant as to details
, 0 of a prior felony conviction was reversible error, but apparently

Jr based its reversal on a "matter of graver importance".

During

cyoss-examination of defendant, the prosecutor was allowed to elicit
testimony of a "disturbance" in Texas, where defendant had been shot,
lnd later charged, but not tried, on the offense of being an
:ccessory to a robbery.

I

The Court found the Texas incident to be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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irrelevant to modus operandi .
. the Texas incident would have no legitimate
probative value as to defendant's complicity in
the robbery charged here.
It's only effect would
be to cast aspersions upon the defendant and to
imply that because he was involved in the Texas
trouble he is a person of evil character who would
be likely to commit such a crime as here charged.
The very purpose of excluding such evidence is to
prevent the prosecution from smearing an accused
by showing a bad reputation and relying on that
for a conviction, rather than being required to
produce adequate proof of the crime in question.
(361 P.2d at 412).
The impact of the evidence of the earlier fight was
precisely the same as the evidence of unrelated crime in State
v. Kazda, 14 Utah (2d) 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963):
It implied that the defendant was implicated in other
crimes, none of them proven, and could have no other
effect than to degrade the defendant and give to the
jury the impression that he had a propensity for
crime.
It is true that the defendant admitted prior
felony convictions, but 'we cannot say with any degree of assurance that there would not have been a
different result' in the absence of such testimony.
(382 P.2d at 409 and quoting Dickson, supra.)
Nor can it be claimed that the appellant somehow opened
up this additional, unrelated area by taking the witness stand.
While it was necessary to set the fight that resulted in the
death of Lynn Oliver in context, inquiry into irrelevant details
had no legitimate purpose and had no direct bearing either on
the State's theory of the case or on the defense presented by the
defendant.
State v. Putzell, 40 Wash. 2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952)
is of interest, there defendant was convicted of first degree
murder.

Defendant, in addition to pleading not guilty, entered

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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a plea of insanity or mental irresponsibility.

The evidence

showed that defendant entered a tavern, approached deceased
and fired several shots, one of which hit deceased.

Deceased

then ran outside, got in a cab, and stated he wanted to go to
ilie hospital.

Defendant followed deceased to the cab, and

pulled him from it.

Defendant then fired three or four more

shots into deceased, as he lie on his back.
arrived and disarmed defendant.

A police officer

Defendant stated to the officer:

"Leave me alone.
I have been after this guy
for a long time and I'm going to get him."
(242 P.2d at 182).
At the trial, defendant testified in his own behalf.

He stated that some two years before the homicide, deceased
had as saul ted him without provocation, and that deceased had
struck him on the head with a fire hose nozzle.

Defendant

stated that as a result of this assault, he was unconscious for
aperiod of some thirteen hours;
ed

that surgery was required, in

which pieces of skull were removed;
~rvous

and unable to sleep;

1 of busses and planes;
Wre

that he had become extremely

that he suffered blackouts, fear

and that his head felt as though ants

crawling in it and an iron band was exerting pressure on it.
During cross-examination of defendant, he denied that

;,e

had carried a gun on the night of the assault two years

Defore the homicide.

The state rebutted over defendant's object-

-en with two witnesses who testified that while defendant had been
-~conscious,

they had removed a pistol and knife from his pocket·

- 11 -
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The trial court held that the evidence was proper rebuttal
to defendant's testimony that he was a peaceful, lawabiding
citizen, and that it was not impeaching on a collateral matter.
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed.

The Court

noted that defendant did not deny the shooting, and that his
main defense was lack of mental responsibility, caused by
deceased's previous aggressive attack.

The Court recognized

that it was proper for the State to show that defendant, not
deceased, had been the aggressor, but that the evidence which
the State had presented on that issue was not probative of it.
" . . . such testimony was not relevant or material
as to the issue of whether or not appellant was the
aggressor, and tended to invite the jury to guess,
speculate and conjecture."
(242 P.2d at 185).
As to whether the evidence was proper rebuttal to
defendant's testimony of his lawabiding nature, the Court noted

E·

that it was defendant who had raised the issue initially, but

~

held nevertheless that the State could not rebut defendant's

PI

testimony by showing specific acts of misconduct, stating:

01

"No rule permits the general character of the
defendant, even when directly put in issue, to
be impeached by showing the commission by him
of a specific crime, other than the one for which
he is on trial."
(242 P. 2d at 185).

u
1

tr

ar

A fortiori, when the character of a defendant is not
in issue, it is improper to attempt to show his bad character

cc

by specific acts.

~

The Court in Putzell, supra, also held the matter to
be collateral and therefore inadmissible to impeach defendant's
testimony.
Finally,

(and perhaps most significantly), the Court
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be
~

stated:
"Conceding, for the sake of argument, that the
rebuttal testimony in question might have been
material; still it should not have been admitted
because its inflammatory nature so far outweighed any materiality it might had had as to
be prejudicial.
Here was a man being tried on
a charge of first degree murder. His defense
was that he was mentally irresponsible as the
result of a prior unprovoked assault on him by
the deceased, and in which occurrence he was not
the aggressor.
The state, to rebut that contention, introduced evidence of finding a gun
and a knife in his pocket.
The purpose of that
testimony was to portray him as a vicious,
quarrelsome man.
The very inflammatory nature
of this testimony leaves no margin for speculation as to whether or not the jury was swayed
by it."
(242 P.2d at 186).
The appellant submits that the purpose of Janice Ortega's
testimony was identical to the reason set forth in Putzell, supra.
There is one other disturbing aspect of this case.
Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the incident was in some
way relevant (which appellant does not concede), whatever minimal
probative value it might have had was greatly outweighed by its
overwhelming potential of creating undue prejudice.

The purpose of

mtroducing the incident was to mislead the jury to the conclusion
I

'that appellant was an evil or bad person, one who is quarrelsome
lnd likely to resort to deadly weapons without justification.

By eliciting the testimony the prosecution misled and
confused the jury beyond the issue of appellant's character.

The

:ntroduction of the testimony was desirable to the prosecution not
tecause it shed light directly on the death of the victim in this
case, but because it put before the jury damaging and prejudicial
- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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information about the defendant's character.
It is precisely this type of information that the
Rules of Evidence seek to .avoid.

Rule 45 states:

" . . . the judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the risk that its
admission will . . . (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the jury,
(Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence).
The questions and rebuttal testimony should have been excluded
because they did "create substantial danger of undue prejudice",
and should have been excluded by the trial court judge.
Under Rule 45 the trial court's failure to exclude
such evidence was an abuse of discretion and reversible error.
The admission of the evidence also violated Rule 47,
which allows proof of character traits, when relevant, pursuant
to Rule 46, except
" . . . that (a) evidence of specific instances of
conduct other than evidence of conviction of a
crime which tends to prove the conduct bad shall be
inadmissible, and (b) in a criminal action evidence
of an accused's character . . . (ii) if offered by
the prosecution to prove his guilt, may be admitted
only after the accused has introduced evidence of
his good character."
The admission of the evidence violated Rule 47(a),
since a specific instance of conduct was admitted, and it was
not a conviction of a crime.

Rule 47(b) (ii) was also violated,

since the appellant did not introduce "evidence of his good
character".
In short, there is simply no justification for the
admission of the evidence of the details of an earlier fight
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with another individual.

In addition the evidence regarding

the kicking of a third party on another occasion was prejudicial

and warrants reversal of the conviction of the appellant in this
case.
POINT II
THE COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER.
The appellant, ELOY PAUL LOPEZ, was charged with the offense

of Murder in the Second Degree in violation of Section 76-5-203(b)
and (c) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

(R. 28).

The State

alleged the following alternative theories for a Second Degree
Hurder charge, that either appellant under:
" . . . Subsection (b) intending to cause serious
bodily injury to Lynn Oliver, he committed an act
clearly dangerous to human life that caused the
death of Lynn Oliver"
or
" . . . Subsection (c) acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life,
he recklessly engaged in conduct which created
a great risk of death to Lynn Oliver and thereby
caused the death of Lynn Oliver."
Both of these theories were submitted to the jury by
~e

Court in its instructions.

(R.

154).

The appellant requested instructions on the lesser
lncluded offense of Manslaughter under §76-5-205 Utah Code Annotated
'1953 as amended) .

(R. 90).

The appellant submitted the theory

cf Manslaughter as a lesser included offense under three alternative

:heories.

(R.

90).

That appellant caused the death of Lynn Oliver
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under one of the following circumstances:
A. That the appellant recklessly caused the
death of Lynn Oliver.l
B. That the appellant caused the death of Lynn
Oliver under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for whic~ there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse;
or

c.

That the appellant caused the death of Lynn
Oliver under circumstances where appellant
reasonably believed the circumstances provided
a moral or legal justification or extenuation
for his conduct although the conduct is not
legally justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances.3
The trial court refused to submit appellant's requested
instruction Number 3 on the alternative theories Band C of ManslauahtH
to the jury.

(R. 158).

And appellant took proper exception to

the Court's failure to so instruct. 4

l.

Section 76-5-205(a) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

2.

Section 76-5-205(b) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

3.

Section 76-5-205(c) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

4.

Counsel for appellant requested both Instructions 3 and l
in writing and took exception to the trial court's failure
to give such request to the jury, properly preserving this
issue on appeal.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51.
State v. Erickson, Utah, 568 P. 2d 750 (1977); State v. Bell,
563 P.2d 186 (1977); and State v. Gleason, 17 u.2d 150,
405 P.2d 793 (1965). Accord:
Rules of Practice in the
District Courts, Rule 5.4.
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A.
THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A RIGHT
TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE JURY IN
THE INSTRUCTIONS.
It has long been the law in the State of Utah, that an
accused in a criminal action has a right to submit to the jury
his theory of the case, and that such theory when properly
requested should be given to the jury in the form of written
instructions.

State v. Stenbeck, 78 U. 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931).

In Utah this right allows for the presentation of instructions on all
defenses and theories, including lesser included offenses, when
such are properly requested by the accused.

State v. Gillian, 23

Utah 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson, Utah, 560
P.2d ll20

(1977).
An accused may make the decision as a matter of trial

strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request instructions on
~sser

included offense if his theory of defense so dictates.

State v. Mora, Utah, 558 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1977); State v. Gellaty,
22 U.2d 149, 152, 449 P.2d 993
426, 428,
P.2d 618

(1969); State v. Valdez, 79 U.2d

432 P.2d 53 (1967); State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278
(1955).

However, when the accused as his theory of the

case requests instructions on lesser included offenses and is
rilling to submit his guilt or innocence to the jury on that
llieory, the trial court as a general rule is duty bound to submit
these alternatives to the trier of the fact.
23 U.2d 374,

State v. Gillian,

375, 463 P.2d 8ll (1970).

When the theory of defense embraces an argument, in
effect in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime as
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charged in the Information but some lesser offense the teachings
of Gillian yet apply.

On this point the Gillian court stated:

One of the fundamental principles to the
submission of issues to juries is that where
the parties so request they are entitled to
have instruction given on their theory of
the case; and this includes on lesser offenses
if any reasonable view of the evidence would
support such a verdict.
(State v. Gillian,
supra, 23 U.2d at 374).
In Gillian this court pointed out the reasons for this
rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness of such a rule.
This court said it should not be the prerogative of the trial court
to direct the jury as to what degree of crime they may find a
defendant guilty or to direct them that they must find him not
guilty if they do not find him guilty of the greater offense.

m

allow this permits the court to be a judge of the facts and to in
effect direct a verdict on the lesser included offenses.

Such a

procedure violates the historical spirit as well as letter of our
system of jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 12
of the Constitution of Utah.
P.2d (1929)

State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279

(Straup, J. concurring).

See also United States v.

Skinner, 437 F.2d 164, 165 (5th Cir. 1971).
B. MANSLAUGHTER IS A LESSER AND INCLUDED OFFENSE
OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
The test most recently given to determine if one

of~n~

is a lesser included offense of another is that found in the
recently revised Utah Criminal Code.
§76-1-402 (3)

Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as amended) provides in pertinent part:
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A defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in the offense charged but may not be convicted of
both the offense charged and the included offense.
An offense is so included when:
(a)
It is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
(b)
It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c)
It is specifically designated by a statute
as a lesser included offense.5

1le.

lurt

The process by which such a determination is made was described in
state v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640 (1934):
The only way this matter may be determined is by
discovering all of the elements required by the
respective sections, comparing them and by a
process of inclusion and exclusion, determine
those common and those not common, and, if the
greater offense includes all legal and factual
elements, it may safely be said that the greater
includes the lesser, if, however, the lesser
offense requires the inclusion of some necessary
element or elements in order to cover the
completed offense, not so included in the
greater offense, then it may be safely said
that the lesser is not necessarily included in
the greater.
(33 P.2d at 645).

ro

in

j[

to

C. WHEN MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES.

79

Conceding that Manslaughter is a lesser included offense

of Murder in the Second Degree under Utah's statutes, the issue

5.
nse

This statute was recently interpreted in State v. Lloyd,
Utah 568 P.2d 357 (1977) and its companion case, State
v. Cornish, Utah, 568 P.2d (1977) wherein this Court held
that the Utah joyriding statute is a lesser included
offense of theft of an operable motor vehicle.
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then becomes when must the trial court instruct the jury on
such a lesser included offense.
The need that such an instruction be given has been
ruled to be a statutory requirement and is found in Utah Code
Annotated §77-33-6

(1953 as amended), which states:

The jury may find the defendant guilty of any
offense the commission of which is necessarily
included in that with which he is charged in
the indictment or information, or of an attempt
to commit the offense.
This provision was expounded upon by the legislature in
the 1973 Criminal Code Revision in §76-1-402(4) which provides:
The court shall not be obligated to charge the
jury with respect to an included offense unless
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense.
(Emphasis Supplied).
The foregoing provision, as this Court noted, codifies
prior existing common law principles dating back to territorial
times in Utah.

People v. Robinson, 6 U. 101, 21 P.403 (1889);

State v. Bender, Utah, 581 P.2d 1019 (1978).
In State v. Bartias, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937),
this Court noted that the failure to give an instruction on
lesser included offenses when requested "

. . clashes with

two fundamental rules of trial in criminal cases:

It has the

effect of the court weighing the evidence and, in effect, limiti~
the jury to a consideration of only part of the evidence (the
defendant's); and it, in effect, casts upon the accused the
burden of proving his innocence or justification."
-

(65 P.2d at llJli

20 -
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When the accused requests a lesser included instruction there should exist a presumption that the requested
instruction be given.

6

Such is the tenor of this Court's

discussions in the past.

In State v. Hyams, 64 U. 285, 230 P.2d

349 (1924), it was stated:
It is, however, always a delicate matter for a
trial court to withhold from the jury the right
to find the accused guilty of a lesser or included
offense, and determine the question of the state
of the evidence as matter of law. That should be
done only in very clear cases.
(64 U.2 at 287)
Accord: State v. Bartias,
91 U. 574, 580, 65 P.2d
1130 (1937).
(Emphas1s Supplied).

n

In recent years this Court has endeavored to set specific
guidelines providing for the submission of lesser included offenses
~1hen

requested.
The statutory necessity of instructing a jury on a

lesser included offense was described in State v. Dougherty,
Utah 550 P.2d 175 (1976).

This Court cited Lisby v. State, 83 Nev.

183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966), which followed a provision similar to
Utah Code Annotated §77-33-6 (1953).
~vada

6.
ing

1132'

Describing the holding of the

Court this Court said:

This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v. Gillian,
supra, 23 U. 2d at 376 wherein it is said:
The usual rule on an appeal in which the challenge
is to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict, is that we review the record in the light
favorable to the jury's verdict. However, in this
situation where the question raised relates to the
refusal to submit included offenses, it is our
duty to survey the whole evidence and the inferences
naturally to be deduced therefrom to see whether there
is any reasonable basis therein which would support a
conviction of the lesser offenses.
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The Court discussed three situations in which
the problem of lesser included offenses are
frequently encountered. First, where there is
evidence which would absolve the defendant from
guilt of a greater offense, or degree, but would
support a finding of guilt of a lesser offense,
or degree; the instruction is mandatory.
Second, where the evidence would not support
a finding of guilt in the commission of the
lesser offense or degree.
For example, the
defendant denies any complicity in the crime
charged, and thus lays no foundation for any
intermediate verdict; or where the elements of
the offenses differ, and some element essential
to the lesser offense is either not proved or
shown not to exist. This second situation
renders an instruction on a lesser included
offense erroneous, because it is not pertinent.
Third, is an intermediate situation.
One where
the elements of the greater offense include all
elements of the lesser offense;
becuae, by its
very nature, the greater offense could not have
been committed without defendant having the intent
in doing the acts, which constitute the lesser
included offense.
In such a situation instructions
on the lesser included offense may be given, because all elements of the lesser offense have been
given. However, such an instruction may properly
be refused if the prosecution has met its burden
of proof on the greater offense, and there is
no evidence tending to reduce the greater offense.
The court concluded by stating that if there be
any evidence, however slight, on any reasonable
theory of the case under which the defendant
might be convicted of a lesser included offense,
the court must, if requested, give an appropriate
instruction.
(550 P.2d at 176-177). 7
The question that arises then when lesser included
instructions are requested is:

7.

was there

. any evidence,

State v. Dougherty, supra, has been followed in State v.
Pierre, Utah 572 P.2d 1338, 1355 (1977), and State v. Bell,
563 P.2d 186, 188 (1977).

- 22 -
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however slight, on any reasonable theory under which the defendant
might be convicted of the lesser (and) included offense . .
of manslaughter.
Bell,

State v. Dougherty, supra, at 177;

Utah, 563 P. 2d 186, 188 (1977)

State v.

(Justice Wilkins, concurring).

If there was such evidence, then the instructions were properly requested and should have been submitted to the jury for consideration.
In the instant case appellant conceded the mutual combat
~tween

himself and the deceased.

(R. 481 et seq.).

The evidence

adduced throughout the trial indicated a barroom brawl between the
two participants.

Part and parcel of appellant's defense was that

due to the alcohol consumed by he and Oliver, that the fight just
escalated.

The testimony was uncontradicted that at least at one

point Oliver was getting the best of appellant.
The trial court although submitting the alternative theories
of Second Degree Murder offered by the State refused to provide the
]ury with the opportunity to apply the facts adduced to the alternative Manslaughter therories offered by appellant.
It was for the jury's decision to decide whether or
not for example the appellant's actions, although not legally
Justified under a theory of self-defense, rose to the level of
~anslaughter,

:ustified.

since appellant reasonable believed his actions were

This theory was offered in appellant's proposed

Instruction No. 3.

(R. 90).

It was conceivable that the jury

OOuld have found the appellant acted intentionally or knowingly
or with a depraved indifference to human life, but reasonably
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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believed his actions justified under the Manslaughter alternative
theory.

The jury also might have conceded the State's theory, but

found, due to the alcohol consumed and other factors involved,
that the appellant was acting under extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which his explanation or excuse was reasonable.
Under the confused circumstances of this barroom confront·
ation, it was for the jury to determine on all the evidence and
proper instruction of alternative theory the degree of offense,
if any, committed.

In review of the decision of the trial court,

this Court must bear in mind that the circumstances of this case
provide a classic example of the escalation of a mutual combat
situation where one of the participants over-reacts and a death
results.

Remembering that the deceased was a lifelong friend of

appellant's and their argument resulted in mutual combative fisticuffs, this circumstance when considered with the evidence that
both participants were acting under the influence, at least partiall:l
of alcohol, require all alternative theories of Manslaughter to be
available to the trier of fact.

A clear reading of the facts in

the instant case can only lead this Court to conclude that the tr~
court erred in submitting the case to the jury on the alternative
theories of Manslaughter propounded by appellant and refused by
the trinl court.
POINT III
THE COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE APPELLANT.
In appellant's proposed Instruction Number 3 (R. 112)
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the appellant requested an instruction that a witness's testimony
may be impeached and the credibility of the witness thus affected
by " . . . his character for honesty or veracity or their opposites."
The trial court failed to so instruct the jury and proper exception

I

)Tit-

was taken thereto by appellant (Tr. at 34).
The State's chief witness at trial was Kim Horrocks, who

1

was the only witness who testified that the appellant kicked
\

Oliver in the head.

At trial appellant called John Watson and

Elmer Martinez to testify concerning Horrocks' character in the
community for truth and veracity vel non.

This evidence was

offered to show her lack of character, since the credibili t" of
Horr0cks was of primary importance during the trial.

Rule 22 of

the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part that:
As affecting the credibility of a witness .
(c) evidence of traits of his character other
than truth, honesty, or integrity or their
opposites, shall be inadmissible . .

.i-

:ialll
be

It was upon this basis that the two defense witnesses
were offered and their testimony admitted by the Court.

However,

in the Court's instruction Number 3 (R. at 146) there is not
indication of what effect or weight such evidence should bear
ve

on the jury's deliberations.

The effect of such an omission by

the trial court left the jury with no standard to determine the
purpose or weight of such evidence.
~

The failure of the Court

guide the jury in weighing the credibility of the defense

witnesses was error and hence requires reversal of appellant's
conviction.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENSE
WITNESS JOHN WATSON TO GIVE HIS OPINION AS TO
THE CHARACTER OF KIM HORROCKS FOR TRUTH OR
VERACITY.
As argued in Point III of this Brief, appellant offered
testimony of the character of Kim Horrocks for impeachment purposes.
The Court refused to allow the testimony of John Watson on this
issue.

The basis of the Court's ruling in a nutshell was that

Watson had never discussed Horrocks' reputation for truth with
others in the community of Lark.

(Tr. at 15).

The trial court

excluded this evidence even though counsel for appellant layed
the following foundation:
Q.
(By Mr. Rich)
Briefly, what is Kim Horrocks'
reputation for truth in the community?

Mr. Marson:

Object, your Honor.

The Court: You have to lay a foundation to show
how he happens to know. Sustain the objection.
Q.
(By Mr. Rich)
How is it you happen to know
about Kim Horrocks' reputation?

A. By knowing her, by talking to her, by living in the
same place.
Mr. Marson:
Your Honor, that is not responsive to
the question and we object.
The Court: Well, he is trying to respond.
answer may remain.

The

Q.
(By Mr. Rich)
Would you finish that last answer
that you were just - -

A. By living in the same place, talking to her and
knowing her is the only thing I could, you know, say
about her truthfulness, is what is between, like me
and her, you know.
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es.

Q. For how long had she lived in the community of
Lark, to your knowledge?
A.

12 years.

Q. And you lived in that community with her for that
period of time or most of that?
A.

Yeah.

Q. All right. And during that period of both of you
living in the community of Lark for 12 years, do you
have an opinion as to what her reputation is?
A.

Yes, I do.
Mr. Marson:

The Court:
objection.
Mr. Rich:
Mr. Marson:

Object, your Honor, as to foundation.
Just a moment.

I will sustain the

I have no other questions.
We have no questions, your Honor.

McCormick, On Evidence (2d Cleary Ed. 1972) at §44 at
90 gives the black letter rule on how such character impeachment

evidence becomes admissible:
In most jurisdictions the impeacher may attach the
character of a witness by using the following
question formula:
"Do you know the general reputation of William
Witness in the community in which he lives for
truth and veracity?"
"Yes."

"What is that reputation?"
"It is bad."
The questions asked of Watson by counsel for appellant
Were formulated on these grounds and hence appropriate.

The

testimony of Watson thus should have been allowed.
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The offer of such testimony and its weight for
impeachment purposes has long been recognized as admissible
in the State of Utah.

See §78-24-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953

as amended), which provides in pertinent part:
. in every case the credibility of the witness
may be drawn in question . . . by evidence affecting
his character, for truth, honesty or integrity . . .
and the ~ury are the exclusive judges of his credibility.
The failure of the Court to allow the impeachment of
the primary State's witness is doubly troublesome in the instant
case, given the blatent character assassination of the accused
based on alleged specific instances of prior bad acts, as argued
in Point I of this Brief.

The failure of the Court to allow Watsor.

testimony was reversible error and mandates a new trial.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, appellant respectfully requests that
due to the individual and collective errors committed at trial
in the instant case, that this Court should reverse his conviction

8.

See also the early statement of the law in State v. Marks,
16 U. 204, 51 P. 1089 (1898).
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and remand the same for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this~ day

of March,

1980.

O'CONNELL & YENGICH
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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